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By WILLIAM H. HENNING and GRANT S. NELSON
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AVOIDANCE OF COMPLETED REAL
ESTATE FORECLOSURES IN BANKRuPTCY
The Eighth Circuit has ruled that in certain situations
noncollusive real estate foreclosures can be set aside as
fraudulent conveyances. This theory has generated
considerable debate, but even if it is reversed legislativelytrustees may be able to obtain comparable results under a
preference theory.

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

WHEN A MISSOURI DEED OF
TRUST is foreclosed pursuant to a power of sale, there is only a limited statutory right of redemption, 1 This right will
be triggered only if the debtor posts a
redemption bond and the mortgagee is
the successful foreclosure purchaser.
Further, the prevailing judicial attitude
is that the sale will not be set aside unless the price is so low that it "shocks the
conscience" of the court and raises an
inference of fraud or unfair dealing by
the mortgagee or trustee. 2 As long as the
proper procedures are followed, the
debtor is not entitled to avoidance or
monetary damages for mere inadequacy
of price. As a result of these policies, it is
not unusual for the debtor's
3 equity to be
sacrificed by foreclosure.
In the last few years, courts interpreting the bankruptcy laws have fashioned
a novel theory which creates, in effect, a
de facto federal right of redemption.
The theory views a foreclosure sale that
brings less than 70 percent of the property's fair market value as a voidable
fraudulent conveyance if the sale occurs
while the debtor is insolvent and within
one year prior to the commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings. The theory
originated with a decision of the United
________________________________________________

Circuit, Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 4 and it was approved

last year by the Eighth Circuit in In re
Hulm.5 Thus, the Durrettdoctrine, as it
has come to be called, is now the law in
Missouri.
The doctrine has been highly controversial and has been opposed
nationally by the real estate bar.6 Despite vigorous debate, it was not
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ments and Federal Judgeship Act of reasoning that the price received at a
1984, 7 but there is reason to believe that noncollusive foreclosure sale constitutes
it may yet be overturned legislatively. If reasonably equivalent value as a matter
that occurs, however, it is possible that a of law.' 2
In Hulm, a case based on pre-1984
similar result may be achieved by analyzing foreclosure sales as voidable pref- law, the Eighth Circuit held that a foreerences rather than fraudulent con- closure sale is a transfer within the
veyances. There is some case authority meaning of section 548.13 With that
for this proposition, but the preference issue resolved, the other elements of an
theory has not yet been fully developed avoidance action under section 548 are
because of the ready availability of Dur- (1) disposition within one year prior to
rett. The purpose of this article is to commencement of bankruptcy, (2) of an
explain both theories to the Missouri interest of the debtor in property, (3)
Bar.
made while the debtor is insolvent, and
The Durrett doctrine is based on a (4) made for less than a reasonably
literal reading of portions of section equivalent value.
548(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
(the "Code"). The relevant language
states:
(a)The trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property . . . that
was made . . . within one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor
voluntarily or involuntarily
(2)(A) received less than reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer ... ;and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such
transfer was made ... or became insolvent
as a result of such transfer.... 8

The foreclosure sale
must occur within one
year prior to
bankruptcy

Under the first element, the foreclosure sale must occur within one year
prior to bankruptcy, but the period of
uncertainty for the purchaser at the sale
There is a split among the circuits as may actually be much longer. An avoidto whether a foreclosure sale constitutes ance action under section 548 may be'
a transfer for purposes of section 548. initiated until the earlier of two years
The vast majority of lower courts have after the appointment of a trustee or the
held that it does and have based their time the case is closed or dismissed. 14
decisions on the statutory definition of Since a trustee may never be appointed
transfer, which specifically includes in- in a Chapter 11 reorganization, a debtor
voluntary dispositions of property. 9 The in possession can bring an avoidance acof
Ninth Circuit, however, examined the tion at any time during the pendency
5
history of fraudulent conveyances and the bankruptcy -proceedings. 1 Even in
held that a foreclosure sale that does not a Chapter 7 liquidation the period of
involve collusive conduct by the debtor uncertainty may exceed three years. 16
As to the second element, a foreclodoes not constitute a transfer for purposes of section 548. 1o This decision was sure sale unquestionably disposes of an
probably legislatively overruled 1 in interest of the debtor in property. In
1984 by amendments making "foreclo- Hulm, a case arising out of a judicial
sure of the debtor's equity of redemp- foreclosure sale in North Dakota, the
tion" part of the definition of transfer Eighth Circuit noted that the sale diand adding the phrase "voluntarily or vested Hulm of legal title, the right to
and his equity of redempinvoluntarily" to section 548(a). The possession,
7
Sixth Circuit has also rejected Durrett, tion. This element would also be satis-
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fled by any nonjudicial foreclosure sale
in Missouri. 18
The third element requires that the
debtor be insolvent at the time of the
foreclosure sale, and the test to be applied is based on the definition of insolvent at section 101(29) of the Code. 19 In
order to be insolvent, the sum of the
debtor's liabilities must exceed the sum
of his or her assets. In applying the test,
the fair market value of the foreclosed
property must be included as an asset
with the value of any liens as a liability.
The final element requires that the
property be sold for less than reasonably
equivalent value, and this element has
produced some controversy. In Durrett, the foreclosure sale brought roughly 58 percent of the property's fair market value and the Fifth Circuit suggested that a sale for less than 70 percent
could be avoided. 2 ° Even though Durrett did not specifically establish 70 percent as the dividing line, that percentage has become a rule of thumb in the
ensuing cases. The Eighth Circuit did
not discuss percentages in Hulm and remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the foreclosure sale price was a 'reasonably
equivalent value for the property. 21 The
Court did, however, expressly disapprove of the theory that absent fraud
or collusion the price received at a foreclosure sale should be deemed a reasonably equivalent value as a matter of
law. 22 It seems likely that the 70 percent
rule will become the norm in the Eighth
Circuit.
The Durrett theory can be used in a
Chapter 7 proceeding or in reorganization cases under Chapters 11 and 1323
Moreover, unlike under statutory redemption, where the redeeming debtor
must pay the mortgage debt, 24 reliance
on Durrett requires no such out of
pocket expenditure. Once the trustee
(or debtor exercising the rights of a trustee in a reorganization 5 ) proves the elements listed above, the property can be
recovered from the immediate purchaser or from any subsequent purchaser

26
who gives less than fair market value.
The purchaser is then granted a lien on
the property for any value given. 27 In a
Chapter 7 proceeding, the trustee will
then proceed to sell the property free of
all liens and satisfy the purchaser's lien
from the sale proceeds. 28 The equity
becomes an asset of the estate. In a reorganization proceeding in which the
property is to be retained by the debtor,

The final element requires
the property be sold for
less than reasonably
equivalent value
the purchaser's lien will typically be
satisfied by payments under the plan.
The purchaser becomes, in effect, a
forced lender.
While recovering the excess value of
foreclosed property for distribution to
unsecured creditors is consistent with
basic bankruptcy policies, the Durrett
doctrine does create some serious problems. First, the period of uncertainty
following foreclosure is entirely too
long. It exists for a minimum of one
year, and if the debtor commences
bankruptcy during that period the
threat of avoidance can linger for three
years or more. The long period of uncertainty may tend to chill bidding at foreclosure sales and prevent development
29
of the land following the sale.
Second, avoidance can be inequitable
when applied to purchasers other than
the original lender. For example, suppose the lender buys residential realty
at the foreclosure sale and then resells
through a broker to a purchaser who
intends to live in the home. While the
purchaser has the right to prevent
avoidance by paying the trustee the difference between the value of the purchaser's lien and the property's fair market value, the exercise of this right may
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prove economically burdensome. In
some instances, the purchaser may be
forced to give up the home.
A third problem occurs in reorganization cases where the ultimate purchaser
is a non-lender. Even if the purchaser is
"adequately protected" in the sense that
she will ultimately receive 100 percent
of her investment through the plan, serious consequences can ensue from having funds tied up for a significant period
of time. This is less of a problem where
the purchaser is a lender whose ordinary
business activities involve repayment of
funds over time.
In addition to avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance, a pre-bankruptcy foreclosure sale that brings less than fair
market value may also be attacked as a
preference. Because of the pervasive
impact of Durrett, the preference
approach is still in its embryonic stage.
However, if Durrett is legislatively
overruled the preference theory is certain to be utilized more frequently.
Consequently, it is important to understand the theory and how it differs from
Durrett.
Under section 547(b)3" of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee may avoid a
transaction if it was (1) a transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property, (2) to
or for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or
on account of an antecedent debt, (4)
made while the debtor was insolvent, (5)
made within 90 days before the commencement of bankruptcy (or between
90 days and one year in the case of
insiders 31), and (6) which enables the
creditor to realize more than he would
have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation.
The first element is identical with one
of the elements in section 548(a) and is
satisfied by the same analysis applicable
in that context. The second, third and
fifth elements are likewise noncontroversial. If the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure sale the transfer will be to a creditor; if a third party
purchases, it will be for the benefit of a
creditor. Since the foreclosure sale is a
________________________________________________

separate transfer it will always be for an
antecedent debt.
The fourth element requires, like section 548(a), that the debtor be insolvent
on the date of the sale, but the trustee's
proof will be easier than in the Durrett
context. Under section 547(), the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent
during the 90 days preceding bankruptcy and the trustee will have to prove
insolvency only in cases where the presumption is rebutted or the transfer was,
to an insider and occurred before the
90-day period commenced.
The sixth element is also present
where the sale brings less than fair market value, but only if the mortgagee is
the purchaser. If the transfer had not
occurred, the mortgagee would have
been treated as a creditor with a secured
claim in a Chapter 7 proceeding and
would have ultimately received the full
value of the debt. By virtue of purchasing at the foreclosure sale; however, the
mortgagee also obtains the debtor's
equity, an asset that would have gone to
unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7 proceeding. Thus, the mortgagee obtains
more by way of foreclosure than it would
have obtained in bankruptcy. This element will not be satisfied if a third party
purchases at the foreclosure sale since
the mortgagee will only be allowed to
retain the amount of the debt.
It can be argued that this analysis is at
odds with the purpose of section 547
because the concept of preference only
applies to the extent that a creditor -is
paid up to the full amount of the debt.
Any excess is not a preference but rather
a fraudulent conveyance voidable under
section 548.32 This argument is, however, unpersuasive. First, the language of
section 547 applies literally to this situation and it is difficult to argue against a
cause of action that is specifically defined in terms of elements when those
elements clearly are satisfied. Moreover, this anti-preference reasoning
reaches the ironic conclusion that section 547 may be used to deal with the
lesser of two wrongs - namely, the
1.
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transfer that gives a creditor up to the
full amount of her claim - but is unavailing to the extent the transfer gives
her more than her due. Indeed, at least
two cases have considered the issue and
have concluded that section 547 can be
used as a foreclosure-avoidance tool. 33

permit secured creditors to reap the
benefit of assets that might have paid off
unsecured creditors. -34 Moreover, both
theories underscore in a powerful way
the inadequacies of a foreclosure system
that normally fails to produce an adequate price for foreclosed real estate.
Neither Durrett nor related theories
One of the cases, Matter of Fountain,
was decided by the Bankruptcy Court are desirable as a permanent part of the
foreclosure landscape. The long term
for the Western District of Missouri.
solution to the problems they address
In some respects, the preference
approach is preferable to the Durrett lies in a major structural reform of state
doctrine. The pre-bankruptcy avoid- foreclosure practices. In an earlier
article, 35 one of us described in detail a
ance period is shortened to 90 days,
although if bankruptcy is initiated dur- foreclosure system for Missouri that we
ing that period there may still be several believe will enhance the likelihood that
years of uncertainty. In addition, since fair market value will be obtained for
the theory only applies where the mort- foreclosed real estate. Under such a sysgagee is the purchaser the problem of tem, mortgaged real estate would be
inequitable treatment of third parties is sold in a manner closely approximating
resolved. Thus, third party bidding is how property is sold in an ordinary nonless likely to be discouraged than in the foreclosure context. W ile the proposed
Durrett setting. On the other hand, system provides for a substantial presince the focus of the preference ap- foreclosure time pe iod to cure default,
proach is on whether the mortgagee re- there would be 6 post-sale redemption. Such a system, we believe, would
ceived more than it would have received
in a Chapter 7 liquidation, unlike Dur- enhance the lilkelihood of foreclosure
rett it may be used to recapture proper- surpluses and reduce the number of dety where more than 70 percent of fair ficiency judgments, a result that would
market value has been paid at the fore- benefit unsecured creditors as well as
mortgagors and junor lienors. Under
closure sale.
such a system, Durrett, its preference
counterpart and statutory 'redemption
CONCLUSION. Durrettand its preference theory counterpart are strong would be both unnecessary and selfEl
medicine. Any post-sale period of title defeating.
defeasibility doubtless discourages foreFOOTNOTES
closure sale bidding. Indeed, because
§§443.410-.440, RSMo 1978. In order to
Missouri statutory redemption is unavailable if a third party purchases, such
exercise the right, the debtor or his successor must give written notice of intent to reparties have heretofore been uncondeem at the sale or within ten days beforecerned about its conseqences. As a rehand, must post a redemption bond within
sult, Durrett may alter third party bidtwenty days after the sale, and must tender
ding practice to a greater degree in Misthe proper amount within one year following
souri than in those states where such the sale. Statutory redemption is further limpurchasers are not insulated from statuited in that it can be exercised only in cases
where the mortgagee is the purchaser at the
tory redemption claims. We are admitsale. See generally, Comment, Statutory Retedly troubled by this prospect. On the
demption Following Power of Sale Forecloother hand, the benefits of Durrettand
sure in Missouri,47 Mo. L. REV. 309 (1982).
the preference alternative to unsecured
2 See, e.g., Jackson v. Klein, 320 S.W. 2d
creditors may outweigh the foregoing
553 (Mo. 1959); Nelson, Deficiency Judgconcern. As one of us has stressed in an
ments After Real Estate Foreclosuresin Misearlier context, "there is no reason to souri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L.
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151, 157-158 (1982). See also
C. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman,
Real Estate Finance Law §7.21 (1979).
3 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 163.
4 621 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally Henning, An Analysis of Durrettand Its
Impact on Real and PersonalPropertyForeclosures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63
N.C.L. REV. 257 (1985).
5 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984).
6 See Summary of the Action of the House
of Delegates, 1983 A.B.A. Proc. 1, 31 (resolution endorsing amendment to state
fraudulent conveyance law and to §548 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
7 Pub. L. 'No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(amending 11 U.S.C. §§101-1113 and certain provisions of Title 28).
8 11 U.S.C. §548(a) (1982), as amended.
Durrettwas decided under §67 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but most of the ensuing
cases, including Hulm, were decided under
§548.
9 11 U.S.C. §101(48) (1982), as amended.
10 In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1984).
11 Interestingly, the overruling of Madrid
was probably an accident. Opponents of
Durrett had sought to change its result by
amendments affirming that a foreclosure sale
is a transfer but equating the price received
at a noncollusive foreclosure sale with
reasonably equivalent value as a matter of
law. The effort to reverse Durrettfailed and
the provision on value was withdrawn, but
the provisions supporting foreclosures as
transfers were left in the Act. Thus, the
opponents of Durrett inadvertently
strengthened the theory by reversing the
Ninth Circuit's conflicting opinion.
12 In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d
1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
13 738 F.2d, at 326.
14 11 U.S.C. §546(a) (1982).
REV.

Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision but expressly declined to follow the Panel's reasoning. 725 F.2d, at 1199. The Sixth Circuit
expressly approved the Panel's reasoning
this year in In re Winshall Settlor's Trust,
supra note 12.
23 See Henning, supra note 4, at 266 notes
59-61 and accompanying text.
24 See §443.410, RSMo 1978.
' A debtor in possession in a Chapter 11
proceeding is authorized to exercise the
powers of a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §1107(a)
(1982).
For a discussion of the debtor's right to
initiate avoidance proceedings in a Chapter
13 proceeding, see Henning, supra note 4, at
283 note 154.
26 11

U.S.C. §§550(a), (b) (1982). §548

governs avoidance generally, while §550
governs the trustee's right to recover the
property or its value after avoidance. Generally, an avoidance action and an action to
recover the property for the estate should be
joined procedurally. If they are not, §550(e)
contains a separate statute of limitations for
commencing a recovery action.
27 The initial purchaser's lien is granted by
11 U.S.C. §548(c). Subsequent purchasers
acquire the initial purchaser's lien. Cf. 11
U.S.C. §550(a).
Both the initial and any subsequent purchaser are also granted a lien to the extent of
improvements which increase the property's
value. 11 U.S.C. §550(d) (1982).
28 The trustee's authority to sell is governed by 11 U.S.C. §363(f) (1982). The purchaser is entitled to "adequate protection" of
his or her interest, and this means that the
purchaser's lien will be satisfied from the
resale proceeds. 11 U.S.C. §363(e) (1982).
29 See Henning, supra note 4, at 276-77.
30 1 U.S.C. §547(b) (1982).
31 The term "insider" is defined in 11
U.S.C. §101(28) (1982), as amended.
32 If state law is the basis for avoidance,
15 11 U.S.C. §1104 (1982) governs
appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 the trustee can use 11 U.S.C. §544(b) (1982).
The trustee's power under this section is
proceeding.
16 11 U.S.C. §702 (1982) governs appointderivative in nature and requires that there
be an actual creditor with an unsecured
proceeding.
7
ment of a trustee in a Chapter
17 738 F.2d, at 326.
claim who could avoid part or all of the trans18 There is no doubt but that the theory
fer under state law.
a In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr.
foreclononjudicial
to
applied
will also be
Ala. 1983); Matter of Fountain, 32
N.D.
266
sures. See Henning, supra note 4, at
Bankr. 965 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1983). A third
note 55.
case, In re Hill, 39 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. D. Or.
1 11 U.S.C. §101(29) (1982).
20 621 F.2d, at 203.
1984), held that there was no separate trans21 738 F.2d, at 327.
fer for bankruptcy purposes. Like Madrid,
22 Id. The Court was referring to a ruling
supranote 10, this reasoning has been legislatively overruled.
of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
34 See Henning, supra note 4, at 276.
Panel in Madrid which followed that theory.
35 See Nelson, supra note 2, at 160-66.
21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). The
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